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HOW TO DETER PEDESTRIAN DEATHS: A UTILITARIAN 
PERSPECTIVE ON CARELESS DRIVING 
John Clennan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the last twenty years, politicians, developers, business 
leaders, academics, and environmentalists have formed coalitions to 
encourage transit-oriented development.1  Proponents of transit-
oriented development argue that jurisdictions need to enact land-use 
reform to mitigate the damage of suburban sprawl.2   
On Long Island, transit-oriented development is big business.  
With the goals of reducing pollution and car dependency, jurisdictions 
grant smart growth developers tax breaks worth millions.3  In most 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2020; St. Joseph’s College, 
B.S. in Business Administration and Social Science, minor in History and American Studies.  
I want to give a special thanks to my family, friends, and coworkers for their support during 
law school.  I want to also thank Professor Lewyn for his advisement and guidance in 
developing this topic.  Next, I would like to express gratitude to Editor-in-Chief, Nicholas 
Maggio, Managing Editor, Olivia Lattanza, and Professor Seplowitz for fast-tracking the 
publication of this note.  Finally, I dedicate this note to the memory of Katlin R. Catalano.  
1 See 2020 Board of Directors, VISION LONG ISLAND, http://visionlongisland.org/board-
members/ (Last visited May 12, 2020) (Vision Long Island is a smart growth advocacy 
organization comprised of business and community leaders.) 
2 Edward J. Sullivan & Jessica Yeh, Smart Growth: State Strategies in Managing Sprawl, 45 
URB. LAW. 349, 351 (2013). 
3 Jurisdictions compete amongst each other by offering developers massive tax breaks.  See 
Rachel O'Brien, Tritec Granted $28.6 Million Tax Break For Lindenhurst Residences, 
NEWSDAY (Dec. 12, 2018 4:30 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/tritec-
lindenhurst-residences-tax-break-1.24484049; see also Denise M. Bonilla, Residents Decry 
Tax Breaks Approved For Wyandanch Building, NEWSDAY (Mar. 2, 2020 5:05 PM), 
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/babylon-wyandanch-rising-tax-breaks-
1.42373714; see also Rachel O'Brien, Tax Deal Would Make Way For 12 Apartments, Family 
Dollar Store In Copiague, NEWSDAY (Jan. 7, 2019 4:05 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-
island/suffolk/darius-masonry-copiague-tax-deal-1.25658821 (“A planned mixed-use 
building in the heart of downtown Copiague may get an almost 50 percent tax abatement. . . 
.”). 
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cases, the new development rejuvenates a historic downtown.4  Once 
abandoned and blighted downtowns can turn into hip nightlife spots.5   
 
However, in the suburbs, transit-oriented development does not 
necessarily reduce car dependency.6  In New York, the “Patchogue 
revival” is “recognized as a model for transit-oriented development 
and a success story for smart growth on Long Island.”7  However, 
without parking, the Patchogue transit-oriented development miracle 
would not have been possible.8  While improved downtowns lead to 
people walking between bars and restaurants, transit-oriented 
development does not necessarily lead to using mass transit.  Instead, 
as evident by the need for more parking, new development, even under 
the guise of transit-oriented development—does not necessarily reduce 
car dependency.9  To this end, Politicians have bemoaned that lack of 
parking is merely a “growing pain” of transit-oriented development.10   
The Village of Patchogue, “Long Island’s model for transit-
oriented development,”11 placed a moratorium on new businesses until 
the Village can establish more parking.12  However, instead of 
evaluating road safety, politicians are focusing on expanding 
 
4 See Michael Dobie, Dobie: Patchogue Comes Back to Life, With Lessons for All of Us, 
NEWSDAY (Jun. 27, 2014 2:35 PM), https://www.newsday.com/opinion/columnists/michael-
dobie/patchogue-comes-back-to-life-with-lessons-for-all-of-us-michael-dobie-1.8592159.    
5 Id. 
6 See Dena Belzer & Gerald Autler, Countering Sprawl with Transit-Oriented Development, 
ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 19, No. 1, at 51-58 (Fall 2002). 
7 LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL, VILLAGE OF PATCHOGUE REVITALIZATION, 
ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS, 5 (Dec. 19, 2018), https://lirpc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Long-Island-RPC-Village-of-Patchogue-Impact-Study-
12.19.18.pdf. 
8 “[T]he installation of four municipal public parking lots on the corners of the Village were 
important, allowing the growing number of visitors to the downtown easier access to its 
businesses and events.”  Id. at 44. 
9 Nicole Fuentes, Patchogue Village Looks to Ban New Bars/Restaurants Until More Parking 
Acquired, LONG ISLAND ADVANCE (Jan. 13, 2020 6:30 PM),  
http://www.longislandadvance.net/stories/patchogue-village-looks-to-ban-new-
barsrestaurants-until-more-parking-acquired,85078.  
10 The Nassau County executive awarded grants to villages and towns so that they can “address 
growing pains of recent TOD development - from parking concerns, to traffic issues, to 
improvements to pedestrian safety.”  Curran Expands Efforts to Advance Transit Oriented 
Development Projects, NASSAU COUNTY, NEW YORK (Sep. 17, 2019) 
https://www.nassaucountyny.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=7546.  
11 See LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL, supra note 7. 
12 “Our restaurants have been a key foundation to our downtown renaissance, but that comes 
with a cost to the Village in the form of parking and public safety.”  Fuentes, supra note 13. 
2
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parking.13  Even more ironically, on Long Island, at the of the dawn of 
transit-oriented development, Suffolk and Nassau County slashed 
funding to mass transit and reduced service.14  In 2016, Suffolk County 
made deep cuts to mass transportation.15  
Despite advocating for transit-oriented development, 
politicians have mostly paid lip service to public transportation.16  In 
2018, the Suffolk County Executive drove to his “car free day” 
celebration.17  Nonetheless, at the celebration, which the County 
Executive hosted near a train station, he promised to make 
improvements to the county bus system.18  As various taxing 
jurisdictions grant generous benefits to transit-oriented development, 
the county agreed to move bus stops out of downtowns and away from 
train stations.19   Spending money to encourage development around 
transportation hubs while slashing mass transportation could make 
 
13 “We need to come up with another 600 or 700 spaces.”  Carl MacGowan, Patchogue Hires 
Consultant to Aid in Finding Downtown Parking, NEWSDAY (Mar. 30, 2020 2:07 PM), 
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/patchogue-downtown-parking-1.43457975; 
see also Lon Cohen, Patchogue's Parking Garage Plans Getting $625K Boost from Suffolk 
County, GREATER LONG ISLAND (Oct. 16, 2019),  
https://patchogue.greaterlongisland.com/2019/10/16/patchogues-parking-garage-plans-
getting-625k-boost-from-suffolk-county/.  
14 See Alfonso A. Castillo, Suffolk County Will Cut 9 Bus Routes in October, Officials Say, 
NEWSDAY (Aug. 4, 2016 11:44 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/suffolk-
county-may-cut-9-bus-routes-in-october-officials-say-1.12132709; see also Alfonso A. 
Castillo, Groups Oppose MTA's Plan to Yank Funding for LI Bus, NEWSDAY (Jul. 23, 2010 
10:00 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/groups-oppose-mta-s-plan-to-
yank-funding-for-li-bus-1.2134966.  
15 Suffolk County eliminated nine bus routes that connected 400 people to downtowns, train 
stations, town halls, colleges, hospitals, medical centers, and a retirement home for veterans.  
Castillo, supra note 18; see also S71 Shirley to Stony Brook Railroad, SUFFOLK COUNTY 
TRANSIT (Apr. 1, 2015) archived at https://studylib.net/doc/8749864/map-s71---suffolk-
county-transit. 
16 On Long Island, Republican and Democrat politicians have run on platforms that encourage 
smart transit-oriented development.  Dan O'Regan, Bellone, Mangano Focus on 
Transportation, Transit-Oriented Development, LONG ISLAND BUSINESS NEWS  
(Mar. 19, 2014), https://libn.com/2014/03/19/bellone-mangano-focus-on-transportation-
transit-oriented-development/.  
17 “Bellone, who said he did not abandon his vehicle but went ‘car-light’ on Friday by not 
using his car as much as he normally would. . . .”  Denise M. Bonilla, On Car Free Day, 
Bellone Unveils Smartphone App for Bus Riders, Details Bike-Share Program, NEWSDAY 
(Sep. 21, 2018 7:49 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/suffolk-bike-share-
1.21194187.  
18 Id. 
19 Riverhead Town has successfully lobbied Suffolk County to move its bus stops away from 
a train station.  The move is to facilitate leasing the former station building to a private coffee 
shop.  Denise Civiletti, Supe: Hampton Coffee Co. To Open at Riverhead Train Station, 
RIVERHEADLOCAL (Jun. 26, 2019 12:19 PM), 
 https://riverheadlocal.com/2019/06/26/hampton-coffee-to-open-at-riverhead-train-station/. 
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good fodder for a political comedian.  However, stakeholders are 
encouraging people to walk as pedestrian death tolls are rising.20  In 
particular, pedestrian deaths on Long Island are some of the highest in 
the United States.21  Smart Growth America placed three out of the 
four congressional districts on Long Island on its list for the deadliest 
congressional districts for pedestrian traffic.22   
To combat pedestrian deaths, local governments mostly focus 
on making improvements to education, enforcement, and 
infrastructure—when funds are available.23  However, enforcement is 
controversial, and some jurisdictions merely focus on citing 
pedestrians.24  In Florida, the Duval County Sheriff’s Office prides 
itself on its pedestrian traffic enforcement.25  Between 2012 to 2016, 
the Duval County Sheriff’s Office utilized twenty-eight separate 
statutes to issue 2,200 tickets to pedestrians.26  Likewise, in Georgia, a 
jury convicted a mother—who did not even own a vehicle—of 
homicide by vehicle.27  The mother was “jaywalking” across a five-
 
20 In 2018 pedestrian deaths reached a twenty-seven-year high and continued to increase.  
Fatality Facts 2018: Pedestrians, INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY,  
https://www.iihs.org/topics/fatality-statistics/detail/pedestrians#fn1ref1 (last visited May 13, 
2020); Colin Beresford, Pedestrian Deaths in 2019 Were Highest in 30 Years, Report Says, 
CAR AND DRIVER (Feb. 27, 2020),  
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a31136893/pedestrian-deaths-increase-2019/.  





23 Education includes so-called “See and be Seen” programs.  In “See and be Seen programs,” 
police issue warning cards to pedestrians and place educational postings at bus stops.  
Municipalities improve road safety by reconstructing crosswalks, reducing traffic speeds, and 
building sidewalks.  Under targeted enforcement, police officers carry out “blitzes” where they 
ticket drivers and pedestrians.  See Richard Retting, Pedestrian Traffic Fatalities by State, 
GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOCIATION, Feb. 2020, at 39-40,  
https://www.ghsa.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/GHSA-Pedestrian-Spotlight-FINAL-
rev2.pdf.  
24 See Topher Sanders et al., Walking While Black, PROPUBLICA & FLORIDA TIMES UNION 
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://features.propublica.org/walking-while-black/jacksonville-pedestrian-
violations-racial-profiling/.   
25 The Duval County Sherriff’s Office claims that pedestrian tickets are a useful tool to stop 
suspicious people.  Furthermore, issuing pedestrian tickets will deter people from illegally 
crossing the street and reduce traffic accidents.  See id. 
26 Id. 
27 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (2020):  
Any person who causes the death of another person, without an intention 
to do so, by violating any provision of this title . . . commits the offense of 
homicide by vehicle in the second degree when such violation is the cause 
4
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lane road with her children when a habitually intoxicated driver struck 
her family.28   
In the Georgia case, the mother was trying to cross the road to 
reach her apartment building from a bus stop.29  The nearest crosswalk 
involved walking over one-and-a-half miles.30  Therefore, the mother 
“jaywalked” across the road with her children.31  The driver of the van 
claimed the family “jumped out in front of [him].32  The driver also 
claimed that he “thought that he had only hit a basket and a post on the 
side of the road.”33  The driver did not stop.34  Regardless, investigators 
claimed the accident occurred because the mother “led” her son “into 
the roadway under unsafe conditions.”35  The case caused a media 
frenzy; nonetheless, nearly ten years after the accident, there is still not 
a crosswalk from the bus stop to the apartment building.36   
However, the climate is changing, and some jurisdictions are 
prosecuting drivers who unintentionally cause pedestrian fatalities.37  
In 2012, New Jersey amended its vehicular homicide statute to include 
death caused by a distracted driver using a cellphone.38  In 2017 the 
New Jersey statute came to national prominence when Monmouth 
 
of said death and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided 
in Code Section 17-10-3. 
Id. 
28 A jury convicted the mother of second-degree vehicular homicide.  The court granted the 
mother a new trial.  Before the new trial, the State allowed the mother to plea to the 
“jaywalking” charge and dropped the homicide charge.  See Nelson v. State, 31 S.E.2d 770 
(Ga. 2012); see also Marcus K. Garner, Homicide Charge Dropped Against Jaywalking Cobb 
Mom, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION (June 13, 2013),  
https://www.ajc.com/news/crime--law/homicide-charge-dropped-against-jaywalking-cobb-
mom/0Nane3VdTqDe5NvUSLIn2H/. 
29 David Goldberg, Protect, Don’t Prosecute, Pedestrians, THE WASHINGTON POST  
(Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/protect-dont-prosecute-
pedestrians/2011/07/28/gIQAny45uI_story.html.  
30 Id. 




35 Id. at 774. 
36 Austell Rd + Austell Circle Bus Stop ID: 920247, GOOGLE MAPS, 
https://www.google.com/maps (then search for Austell Rd + Austell Circle) (last visited May 
13, 2020).   
37 See Nate Schweber & Tracey Tully, She Texted About Dinner While Driving. Then A 
Pedestrian Was Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/nyregion/texting-driving-vehicular-homicide-nj.html.  
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (2012) (“Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held 
wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c. 310 
(C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.”  
5
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County prosecutors secured an indictment against a driver who caused 
the death of a pedestrian.39  The driver declined to take a plea that 
would have resulted in a sentence of three-to-five years.40  Instead, the 
driver went to trial, and a jury of her peers came back with a 
conviction.41  The driver is currently awaiting sentencing.42 
As the suburbs increase density to encourage growth, 
pedestrian safety must become paramount.  Therefore, the purpose of 
this note is to analyze potential criminal penalties under current New 
York Law for motor vehicle accidents that result in pedestrian deaths.  
Furthermore, this note will make recommendations as to how the New 
York State Legislature can reform existing laws to penalize drivers 
who carelessly cause the death of a pedestrian.  To that end, criminal 
penalties for careless driving are significant because penalties can 
deter other careless drivers.   
In this note, Part II will explain the theory behind using 
criminal punishment to deter subsequent criminal conduct.  Part III 
will discuss the evolution of current New York criminal statutes as 
applied to careless driving that causes death.  Part IV will compare how 
New Jersey and Georgia penalize careless driving that results in the 
loss of life.  Finally, Part V will explain why New York needs to reform 
or enact new statues to deter careless driving.  
II. DETERRENCE 
Proponents of utilitarian punishment believe that punishment 
must result in the reduction of future crime.43  Under utilitarian 
punishment, a judge must consider the deterrent value in imposing 
punishment.44  There are two considerations to deterrence: individual 
and general.45  Preventing recidivism is the primary focus behind an 
individual or specific deterrence.46  This note focuses on general 
deterrence as a method to improve road safety.   
 
39 See Schweber, supra note 37. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Meg Oliver, New Jersey Woman Faces 10 Years in Prison for Deadly Texting While Driving 
Case, CBS NEWS (November 26, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-
jersey-woman-faces-10-years-in-prison-for-deadly-texting-while-driving-case-2019-11-26/.  
43 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14 (7TH ED. 2015). 
44 People v. McConnell, 402 N.E.2d 133, 135 (1980). 
45 DRESSLER, supra note 43. 
46 Id. at 16. 
6
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Under the theory of general deterrence, a judge imposes a 
reasonable sentence that deters subsequent people from committing 
similar criminal conduct.47  Utilitarians premise general deterrence on 
the theory that potential offenders will see the impact of the 
punishment that society extends to individual conduct and, therefore, 
will avoid participating in similar conduct.48  Some utilitarianists think 
that punishment absent a deterrence value is fundamentally unfair.49   
In part, New York enacted its Penal Law to:  
[P]roscribe unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or 
threatens substantial harm to individual or public 
interests;. . . [t]o provide for an appropriate public 
response to particular offenses, including consideration 
of the consequences of the offense for the victim, 
including the victim’s family, and the community; and 
[t]o insure the public safety by preventing the 
commission of offenses through the deterrent influence 
of the sentences authorized. . . .50 
Thus, in enacting the Penal Law, the Legislature recognized general 
deterrence is a crucial aspect of sentencing in New York.51   
  In People v. Suitte,52 the Second Department noted that 
“deterrence is [a] primary and essential postulate of almost all criminal 
law systems.”53  Moreover, at sentencing, “the judge may look beyond 
the offender to the presumed effect of the sentence on others.”54 
However, there are several reasons why general deterrence is 
controversial.  First, in a high publicity case, the accused can face 
 
47 Daniel M. Farrell, Using Wrongdoers Rightly: Tadros on the Justification of General 
Deterrence, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1 (2015). 
48 Major Owen Basham, General Deterrence Arguments (an Excursion Ticket, Good for This 
Day and Trip Only), THE ARMY LAWYER (April 1979), at 5 (Major Basham’s article is a 
critique on military law as applied to general deterrence.  However, Major Basham includes a 
good analysis of the philosophy behind general deterrence.). 
49 Gabriel v. Brame, 28 So. 2d 581, 582–83 (Miss. 1947):  
“Two propositions are fundamental, as we think, the first of which is that 
punishment for crime has its basis solely in its effect as a deterrent as 
against future offenses-that punishment for the sake of punishment, or for 
vengeance alone, has no place in the processes of human tribunals.  And 
as a deterrent, a present offender is as much within the object as others in 
general.”   
Id. 
50 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(1), (5), (6) (McKinney 2019) (emphasis added). 
51 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05. 
52 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1982). 
53 Id. at 680 
54 Id. (citing United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1974)). 
7
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unusually harsh punishments for the sake of the deterrent value.55  
Second, opponents of utilitarianism argue that it is fundamentally 
unfair to publicly humiliate the accused for the sake of deterring future 
crime.56  In essence, opponents of general deterrence contend that 
society is immorally using the accused by making an example out of 
her.57  Finally, opponents of general deterrence claim it is a logical 
fallacy to assume people act rationally.58  Opponents further argue that 
certain crimes may be immune to general deterrence.59  Specifically, 
people who suffer from compulsive behavior (such as substance abuse) 
or commit crimes of passion do not rationally decide to commit a crime 
or participate in reckless behavior.    
The opponents’ arguments are not without merit.  First, under 
the utilitarian view, the punishment in a high-profile case should shock 
the public conscience.60  Therefore, if a case has, for some reason, 
attracted great publicity, a severe sentence could be expected to have 
a significant deterrent effect.61  For punishment to have a general 
deterrence effect, community awareness and media attention are 
necessary.62  If the public is not aware, then the rational person cannot 
take notice and alter her behavior.63  Second, proponents of general 
deterrence argue that it is not immoral, nor is society using the 
 
55 Opponents further argue that a harsh sentence in the name of general deterrence does not 
enhance deterrence.  See Mirko Bagaric & Peter Isham, A Rational Approach to the Role of 
Publicity and Condemnation in the Sentencing of Offenders, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 275 
(2019). 
56 See id. 
57 See Daniel M. Farrell, Using Wrongdoers Rightly: Tadros on the Justification of General 
Deterrence, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1 (2015). 
58 Under the rational approach an actor makes a cost benefit analysis before engaging in 
reckless or intentional conduct that can lead to punishment.  See William L. Barnes, Jr., 
Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing A Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and 
Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627, 640 (1999). 
59 See Johannes Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific Offenses, 38 CHI. U. L. REV. 3 (1971). 
60 “If the sentencing judge wishes to attach weight to the general preventive effect of a 
particular sentence, he should consider the publicity which the decision will receive and the 
possible reactions of those people who will hear or read about the decision.”  Johannes 
Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 CHI. U. L. REV. 649, 656 (1970).  
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.:  
If, on the other hand, the publicity is minimal and the sentence probably 
will be known only to the defendant himself and the officials involved with 
the case, the judge could let the offender off with a light sentence without 
sacrificing any general preventive effects. 
Id. 
8
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accused.64  Instead, some criminal law theorists argue that the accused 
owes a duty to the victim to prevent future wrongdoing.65  Finally, the 
opponents are correct; utilitarianism will not prevent crimes of passion 
or compulsive behavior.  However, unintentional death due to careless 
driving is not necessarily a result of compulsive behavior or a crime of 
passion.  
III. EXISTING NEW YORK STATUTES 
Currently, New York does not have a vehicular homicide 
statute that is as broad as the Georgia66 or New Jersey67 statutes.68  The 
New York vehicular homicide statute is limited to cases that concern 
intoxication, transporting hazardous materials, and driving a 
snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle while intoxicated.69  Absent 
 
64 See Farrell, supra note 57. 
65 “The accused owes a duty to the victim of future protection.”  See VICTOR TADROS, THE 
ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 276 (Sep. 15, 2011). 
66 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (2020). 
67 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (2020). 
68 Cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (McKinney 2019), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 
2020), and GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (2020). 
69 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (McKinney 2019):  
A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when he 
or she causes the death of another person, and either: (1) operates a motor 
vehicle . . . or operates a vessel or public vessel . . . and as a result of such 
intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined 
influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such motor 
vehicle, vessel or public vessel in a manner that causes the death of such 
other person, or (2) operates a motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight 
rating of more than eighteen thousand pounds which contains flammable 
gas, radioactive materials or explosives . . . and such flammable gas, 
radioactive materials or explosives is the cause of such death, and as a 
result of such impairment by the use of alcohol, operates such motor 
vehicle in a manner that causes the death of such other person, or (3) 
operates a snowmobile . . . or operates an all terrain vehicle . . . and as a 
result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the 
combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates 
such snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that causes the death of 
such other person.  If it is established that the person operating such motor 
vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle caused 
such death while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol 
or a drug, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of 
such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the 
combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such 
person operated the motor vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or 
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intoxication and depending on circumstances, prosecutors can 
currently charge a careless driver who kills a pedestrian, with reckless 
driving,70 reckless endangerment,71 criminally negligent homicide,72 
and second-degree manslaughter.73  Reckless driving falls under the 
Vehicle and Traffic Code; whereas, Reckless Endangerment, 
Criminally Negligent Homicide, and Manslaughter fall under the Penal 
Law.74  
However, the issue with recklessness and criminal negligence 
is that both levels of culpability require more than merely breaking the 
Vehicle and Traffic Code—even if it results in death.  As this note 
demonstrates below, to prove criminal negligence or reckless 
culpability, prosecutors need what has colloquially become known as 
the “rule of two.”75   
The “rule of two” is the theory that prosecutors can only secure 
a conviction for the death of a pedestrian if the driver violated two or 
more traffic provisions.76  Instead, prosecutors must show some 
“moral blameworthiness.”77  Mere traffic violations, even when it 
results in tragic consequences, are not “moral blameworthy 
conduct.”78 
A. Recklessness 
In New York, there are two statutes that the prosecution can 
use against a driver who recklessly causes the death of a pedestrian.79  
The first statute is reckless driving.80  The second statute is reckless 
 
70 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (McKinney 2019). 
71 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 - 120.25 (McKinney 2019) (first- and second-degree Reckless 
Endangerment are not Homicide statutes). 
72 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2019). 
73 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2019). 
74 C.f. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1212 (McKinney 2019); with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 
(McKinney 2019); and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 2019). 
75 Brad Aaron, Is There Really a “Rule of Two”?, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 22, 2012), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2012/02/22/is-there-really-a-rule-of-two/. 
76 “Vehicular-crime cases in New York are usually based on a driver’s committing at least two 
traffic infractions, which prosecutors informally call ‘the rule of two.’  Speeding alone is 
frequently insufficient to establish criminality.” J. David Goodman, Prosecutors Face Test 
Proving Serious Crime in a Fatal Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/nyregion/serious-charges-in-fatal-crashes-pose-
challenge-for-prosecutors.html?pagewanted=all. 
77 See People v. Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008).   
78 See id. 
79 Infra notes 80, 81. 
80 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (McKinney 2019). 
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endangerment.81  Under both statutes, the actor must commit reckless 
culpable conduct.  In New York, a person acts with reckless culpable 
conduct when she:  
[I]s aware of and consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that 
such circumstance exists.  The risk must be of such 
nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable person would observe in the situation.82 
The elements of reckless endangerment overlap with reckless driving.  
However, under reckless driving, the accused must “unreasonably 
interfere[] with the free and proper usage of a public highway or 
unreasonably endanger[] users of the public highway.”83 
1. Reckless Driving 
In New York State a person recklessly drives when she uses 
“any motor vehicle, motorcycle or any other vehicle propelled by any 
power other than muscular power or any appliance or accessory thereof 
in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use 
of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public 
highway.”84  Furthermore, a person drives recklessly when she 
unreasonably shows a disregard for the consequences of her driving.85   
The driver must show a reckless disregard for the consequences 
of her driving, which interferes with the use of a public roadway.86  
Breaking other rules of the road, such as speeding, is not enough to 
warrant a reckless driving conviction.87  Furthermore, an accident—
without something more—can not lead to an inference that a driver 
drove recklessly.88  Likewise, mere negligence is not reckless 
 
81 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 – 120.25 (McKinney 2019). 
82 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3) (McKinney 2019). 
83 The People’s failure to prove reckless endangerment does not necessarily foreclose a 
conviction of reckless driving.  The People could prove reckless driving because an element 
of reckless driving is interfering with use of a public highway.  People v. Sanchez, 34 N.Y.S.3d 
565, 569 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2016). 
84 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (McKinney 2019). 
85 People v. Grogan, 183 N.E. 273, 275 (N.Y. 1932); People v. Armlin, 160 N.E.2d 478, 479 
(N.Y. 1959).  
86 Grogan, 183 N.E. at 277; People v. Sanchez, 34 N.Y.S.3d 565, 569 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2016). 
87 Sanchez, 34 N.Y.S.3d at 568-69. 
88 The occurrence of an accident does not automatically lead the inference that the Accused 
drove recklessly.  People v. Blakeslee, 15 N.Y.S.3d 638, 644 (Tompkins Cty. Ct. 2019). 
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driving.89  The reckless driving statute focuses on the accused’s 
conduct.90  For a guilty conviction, the accused must display “wilful 
or wanton disregard of the rights of others.”91     
In People v. Smith,92 the court found that the accused did not 
commit criminal conduct because she was not “intoxicated or impaired 
. . . [and] did not speed or disobey traffic signals.93  Instead, the 
defendant looked away to make a turn and did not look back to check 
for a pedestrian.94  For the People to win a proper conviction for 
reckless driving, the People must prove a multitude of factors.  The 
court needs to analyze all of the accused’s actions leading up to the 
accident.95  In People v. Goldblatt,96 the court found that the jury could 
use the facts that the accused was speeding, disregarding traffic signs, 
intoxicated, and swerving to infer that he drove recklessly.97   
Reckless driving is more than one action that results in death. 
Instead, a court must look at all of the driver’s conduct.  Thus, multiple 
instances of negligent conduct can lead to the inference that the driver 
drove recklessly.  
2. Reckless Endangerment 
In New York, a person is guilty of second-degree reckless 
endangerment “when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates 
a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person.”98  First-
degree reckless endangerment requires “depraved indifference to 
 
89 Civil negligence is not the same as criminal negligence.  Even in a reckless driving charge 
the People must prove more than mere negligence.  The People must show the accused had 
culpability.  Merely driving through a stop sign does not create culpable negligence.  People 
v. Garo, 144 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (Broome Cty. Ct. 1955). 
90 In re Vincent H., 775 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004), aff'd, 790 N.Y.S.2d 890 
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005) (the case was in family court because the accused was a juvenile). 
91 People v. Smith, 90 N.Y.S.3d 800, 803 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2018) (the unwise decision of 
the Accused that resulted in the Accused fatally striking a pedestrian did not rise to the level 
of criminal conduct.  “Defendant was not intoxicated or impaired; she did not speed or disobey 
traffic signals; she checked her rear view and driver's side mirrors before executing the turn; 
and attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to stop the vehicle in the seconds after the collision and 
avoid striking the pedestrian.”). 
92 See generally 90 N.Y.S.3d 800 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2018). 
93 Id. at 803. 
94 Id. 
95 See People v. Goldblatt, 950 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212-15 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012). 
96 950 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012). 
97 Id. at 213. 
98 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 2019). 
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human life.”99  Depraved indifference involves “an utter disregard for 
the value of human life.”100  Voluntary intoxication is not a defense of 
reckless conduct.101   
Reckless endangerment requires that the accused act with a 
“heightened sense of awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. 
. . .”102  Next, the People must prove that a reasonable person could 
foresee that the accused’s conduct would result in the harm or risk of 
the harm alleged.103  Second, the accused’s conduct must cause the risk 
of physical harm.104  When combined, a multitude of actions can rise 
to the culpable level of recklessness that constitutes reckless 
endangerment.105  Speeding alone may not constitute reckless 
conduct.106  However, speeding combined with driving the wrong way, 
and ignoring traffic signals can constitute reckless conduct.107   
In People v. King,108 a police officer, while driving down a 
road, allegedly opened his vehicle door.  The vehicle door knocked 
into a cyclist and the cyclist’s passenger.109  The vehicle door 
“propelled” the bicycle, cyclist, and the cyclist’s passenger into a 
nearby pedestrian.110  Then, the police officer closed the vehicle door 
and allegedly sped off.111  The officer did not come forward; however, 
he purportedly admitted to his partner that he opened the vehicle door 
because the cyclist cursed at him.112  On appeal, the court upheld the 
verdict of reckless endangerment because a jury could infer reckless 
conduct because he told his partner that he hit the cyclist, and he did 
not stop to render aid.113  However, currently, with the “rule of two,” 
 
99 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2019). 
100 People v. Wilson, 109 N.E.3d 542 (N.Y. 2018) (quoting People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 
1163, 1173 (N.Y. 2006)). 
101 Id. 
102 People v. Reagan, 683 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (App. Div. 2d 1998).  
103 People v. Roth, 604 N.E.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. 1992) (“For purposes of criminal liability, it was 
not enough to show that, given the variety of dangerous conditions existing at the site, an 
explosion was foreseeable; instead the People were required to show that it was foreseeable 
that the explosion would occur in the manner that it did.”). 
104 People v. Beam, 866 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008). 
105 See People v. Sanchez, 34 N.Y.S.3d 565 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2016). 
106 Id. at 558-69. 
107 Id. 
108 529 N.Y.S.2d 172 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1988). 




113 Id. at 173-74. 
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it is unlikely that a driver who “doors” a pedestrian would face any 
charges, let alone reckless endangerment.114 
First-degree reckless endangerment is outside the scope of this 
note.  Nevertheless, to sustain a conviction of first-degree reckless 
endangerment, the People need to prove something more than a 
careless operation that results in loss of life.115  Generally, evidence 
that the accused participated in other crimes, such as driving while 
intoxicated,116 fleeing from the police,117 or participating in a fight118 
can demonstrate a “depraved indifference to human life.”119 
B. Negligent Homicide 
Conduct, an act or omission120 that causes the death of another 
person, is homicide.121 Criminal negligence is a level of criminal 
culpability where a person: 
[F]ails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that such result will occur or that such circumstance 
exists.  The risk must be of such nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the situation.122 
In New York, criminally negligent homicide123 and second-degree 
manslaughter124 require the culpability of criminal negligence.  
Nevertheless, not every act of carelessness constitutes criminal 
 
114 In 2012, an unlicensed driver caused the death of pedestrian when he alleged struck a cyclist 
with the door of his vehicle.  The force of the door caused the cyclist into the path of a bus.  
Brad Aaron, Is There Really a “Rule of Two”? STREETS BLOG NYC (Feb. 22, 2012), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2012/02/22/is-there-really-a-rule-of-two/. 
115 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2019). 
116 See People v. Davis, 576 N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1991) (During a blizzard, the 
accused drove a snowmobile on a public highway while under the influence of marijuana, and 
cocaine.  The accused struck someone and left the person in the road.  Leaving the victim in 
the road helpless supported the accused’s conviction).  
117 See People v. Kenney, 733 N.Y.S.2d 124 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001). 
118 See People v. Saunders, 613 N.Y.S.2d 386 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994). 
119 Id. 
120 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00(4) (McKinney 2019). 
121 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2019). 
122 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4) (McKinney 2019). 
123 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2019). 
124 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2019) 
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2020], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss2/5
2020 HOW TO DETER PEDESTRIAN DEATHS 449 
negligence.125  Criminal negligence requires a higher level of 
culpability than mere civil negligence.126   
The Accused must have a severe level of blameworthiness for 
the conduct that resulted in the death of a victim.127  A string of 
unfortunate events may not rise to the level of criminal negligence.128  
Nevertheless, the accused’s state of mind is the difference between 
criminally negligent homicide and second-degree manslaughter.129  
State of mind is determined: 
[E]ntirely on the circumstances of the particular 
conduct.  Whether in those circumstances the act or acts 
causing death involved a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk, and whether the failure to perceive it was such as 
to constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care 
which a reasonable man would have observed under the 
same circumstances. . . .130 
Therefore, under criminally negligent homicide, the accused is not 
aware of the risk.131  Instead, under criminally negligent homicide, the 
accused “failed to perceive the risk in a situation where [he] has a legal 
duty of awareness.132  Whereas in second-degree manslaughter, the 
accused appreciated the risk of harm but continued acting, and that 
action resulted in death.133 
 
125 People v. Boutin, 555 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1990). 
126 Id. 
127 It is not enough that the elements of criminal negligence are met.  Underlying conduct that 
caused death is required as well.  Id. at 255. 
128 See id.  
129 “The essential distinction between the crimes of manslaughter, second degree, and 
criminally negligent homicide is the mental state of the defendant at the time the crime was 
committed.”  People v. Stanfield, 330 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1975), overruled on other grounds 
by People v. Glover, 439 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1982). 
130 People v. Haney, 284 N.E.2d 564, 568 (N.Y. 1972). 
131 See People v. Haney, 284 N.E.2d 564 (N.Y. 1972). 
132 Id. at 567:  
The present law [criminally negligent homicide] lacks the moral 
implication of murder or manslaughter in the first or second degree, each 
of which involves awareness of the harm which will (or in some degree 
probably will) result from the offender's conduct.  Criminally negligent 
homicide, in essence, involves the failure to perceive the risk in a situation 
where the offender has a legal duty of awareness.  It, thus, serves to provide 
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1. Criminally Negligent Homicide 
In New York, “[a] person is guilty of criminally negligent 
homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of 
another person.”134  First, criminally negligent homicide does not 
include every action of carelessness that results in someone’s death.135  
Second, the elements require that the significance of the accused’s 
wrongdoing violates the community’s sense of right and wrong.136  
Furthermore, under criminally negligent homicide, the accused does 
not have to have a conscious awareness of her acts.137  Therefore, 
criminally negligent homicide requires a lower level of culpability than 
reckless driving.138 
To sustain a conviction of criminally negligent homicide, the 
People must prove that the accused’s actions are the direct result of the 
victim’s death.139  It is not enough that the accused set off a chain of 
events that resulted in the victim’s death.140  In People v. Ballenger,141 
the accused, a passenger in the vehicle, grabbed the vehicle’s steering 
wheel and caused it to hit a guard rail.142  Thirty minutes after the 
accused allegedly caused the first accident, several other vehicle 
accidents occurred.143  Queued traffic due to lane closures caused by 
the accused’s accident was the direct cause of the subsequent 
accidents.144  The court held that the accused could foresee that his 
actions could cause lane closures; however, probable accidents caused 
by possible lane closures were not criminal negligence.145 
 
134 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2019). 
135 People v. Beiter, 432 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1980). 
136 “[T]he elements of the crime ‘preclude the proper condemnation of inadvertent risk creation 
unless’ the significance of the circumstances of fact would be apparent to one who shares the 
community's general sense of right and wrong.”  Id.  
137 See Myers v. State, 667 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1013 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1997). 
138 It is interesting that reckless driving has a higher burden than some homicide statutes, 
because reckless driving is in the Vehicle and Traffic Code, whereas the homicide statutes are 
in the Penal Law.  People v. Boice, 455 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1982). 
139 See People v. Ballenger, 968 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013). 
140 See generally id. 
141 968 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013). 
142 Id. at 611-12. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 612. 
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In People v. McDermott,146 the accused pulled a home-made 
trailer behind his vehicle.147  The accused did not license, nor register 
his trailer.148  At one point, the accused pulled into the median of an 
interstate highway because he thought there was something wrong 
with the trailer.149  By pulling into the median, he disregarded highway 
signage that forbids parking or making U-turns in the median—pulling 
into the median of the interstate set off a chain of events that caused a 
multicar accident that resulted in the death of another driver.150  The 
court held that the accused did not commit criminal negligence by 
merely ignoring a road sign.151  However, when tallied, the accused’s 
actions—ignoring the sign, stopping in the median, pulling an 
unlicensed trailer, the road conditions caused by heavy rain—proved 
the accused had the culpability of criminal negligence.152 
People v. Haney153 is one of the earliest examples of criminally 
negligent homicide as applied to careless driving.  In Haney, a driver 
was speeding, ignored a stoplight, and ran over a pedestrian.154  The 
pedestrian had just exited from a bus and had the right of way.155  The 
driver struck the pedestrian in the crosswalk.156  The force of the 
accident flung the pedestrian over 100 feet away from the accident 
site.157  After hitting the pedestrian, the vehicle continued to go 
forward until it crashed into a telephone pole.158  When a police officer 
placed the accused under arrest, the accused kept repeating that he 
“didn’t mean to hit her.”159  The court held that hitting a pedestrian 
who has the right of way in a crosswalk may not arise to criminal 
negligence.160  Nevertheless, hitting the pedestrian in the crosswalk, 
combined with excessive speed, clear vision, and ignoring a stoplight, 
 
146 790 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2005). 
147 Brief for the Respondent at 3, People v. McDermott, 790 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 




151 McDermott, 790 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2005). 
152 Id.; Brief for the Respondent at 3, People v. McDermott, 790 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3d 
Dep’t 2005) (No. 2004-00393), 2004 WL 3560170, at 3. 
153 N.E.2d 564 (N.Y. 1972). 
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could lead a jury to the reasonable inference that the accused acted with 
criminal negligence.161  
However, in a 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals may have 
created the “rule of two” when it took the teeth out of criminal 
negligence as it relates to careless driving.162  In People v. Cabrera,163 
the court retreated from the standards set in Haney.164  In Cabrera, the 
accused drove his friends to a lake to go swimming.165  The accused 
violated the terms of his junior license by having more than two 
underage people in his vehicle.166  Moreover, the accused did not wear 
his seatbelt, did not require his passengers to wear their seatbelts, and 
was driving thirty miles per hour over the speed limit.167  The accused 
took a corner too fast, and the “vehicle went off the left-hand side of 
the road, it slid down a 25–to–30–foot embankment.”168   
The crash killed two people in the accused’s vehicle.169  The 
court held that the accused’s carelessness in speeding was not enough 
to uphold a verdict of criminally negligent homicide.170  Instead, the 
People needed to show that the driver committed an affirmative action 
that “transform[s] ‘speeding’ into ‘dangerous speeding;’ conduct by 
which the defendant exhibits the kind of ‘serious[ly] blameworth[y]’ 
carelessness whose ‘seriousness would be apparent to anyone who 
shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong.’”171  
 Here, the majority distinguished Cabrera from Haney because 
the accused in Haney caused the death of another person when he ran 
a red-light signal while speeding.172  In comparison, the accused, in 
Cabrera, was merely speeding.173  Therefore, in Cabrera, the majority 
held that “a young and inexperienced but sober driver, [who] entered 
a tricky downhill curve, . . . at a [high] rate of speed” did not commit 
seriously blameworthy conduct when his careless driving caused the 
death of three people.174 
 
161 Id. at 569. 
162 See People v. Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008). 
163 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008). 
164 Cf. Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008), with Haney, N.E.2d 564 (N.Y. 1972). 
165 Cabrera, 887 N.E. 2d at 1133. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 1134. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1136. 
171 Id. (quoting Boutin, 555 N.E.2d 253). 
172 Id. at 1136-37. 
173 Id. at 1138. 
174 Id. 
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Nevertheless, the dissenting judges noted that a jury could draw 
the inference of criminal negligence.175  The dissenting judges 
compared the accused’s actions in Cabrera with the actions of the 
accused in Haney.176  First, the dissenters cited excessive speed.177  
Next, the dissenters noted that the accused broke the conditions of his 
junior driver’s license by having too many people in the vehicle.178  
Finally, the dissenters pointed out that the accused further broke the 
conditions of his junior license by not requiring all of the passengers 
in the vehicle to wear a seatbelt.  Therefore, like the Haney court, the 
dissenters found that these actions together could lead the jury to infer 
criminal negligence.179  
In 2015, the Third Department upheld a conviction of 
criminally negligent homicide against a driver who killed a person who 
was standing on her front yard.180  In People v. Olsen,181 a driver lost 
control of her vehicle, on a country road, and went careening across a 
front lawn, striking a bystander.  Using the rule of two (without 
mentioning it), the court upheld the conviction because, at the trial, 
witnesses testified that the accused was using a cellphone, weaving in 
and out of traffic, and passing vehicles.182  Olsen distinguishes 
Cabrera, because in Olsen the accused participated in overt conduct—
using the cellphone, and illegally passing vehicles—while speeding.183  
In comparison, in Cabrera, the driver merely sped.184     
Nevertheless, in 2018, the Second Department dismissed, 
albeit weak charges, of criminally negligent homicide against a 
 
175 Id. at 84 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 82 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
178 Id. (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
179 Id. at 83 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
180 People v. Olsen, 1 N.Y.S.3d 555 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015). 
181 1 N.Y.S.3d 555 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015). 
182 Id. at 558: 
[W]e reject defendant's claim that her conduct was not sufficiently 
blameworthy to support the criminally negligent homicide conviction and 
conclude that her actions evinced ‘the kind of “seriously blameworthy” 
carelessness whose “seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares 
the community’s general sense of right and wrong. . . .  [The] defendant 
engaged in unsafe passing and drove in an erratic manner while looking at 
her cell phone, which ultimately caused her to lose control of her vehicle 
and fatally strike an innocent bystander. . . . 
Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008). 
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limousine driver.185  In People v. Pino,186 a limousine driver 
miscalculated a turn.187  A pickup truck, driven by an intoxicated man, 
broadsided the limousine, which caused the death of four 
passengers.188  The court held that the People, “did not establish ‘the 
kind of seriously condemnatory behavior that the Legislature 
envisioned when it defined “criminal negligence,” even though the 
consequences here were fatal.’”189  Here, the actions of the limousine 
driver were negligent and tragic by not criminally negligent. 
Again, in 2020, the Second Department upheld the “rule of 
two,” when it invalidated a 2016 conviction against a man who caused 
a three-vehicle accident on an upstate parkway.190  The court held that 
the People failed to “establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant ‘fail[ed] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk’ 
which caused the death” of another person.191  
At issue in People v. Deriva,192 was whether the accused had 
enough space to pass another vehicle.  Here, similar to the other cases, 
speed was a factor; however, quoting Cabrera, the court held that the 
People failed to prove conduct other than carelessness.193  In Deriva, 
the accused miscalculated a lane change while speeding.194  The court 
held that a mere miscalculation does not “transform speeding into 
dangerous speeding.”195  Deriva distinguishes Olsen because, in 
Olsen, the accused committed other affirmative acts such as using the 
cellphone and weaving in and out of traffic.196   
 
185 People v. Pino, 78 N.Y.S.3d 408 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2018), leave to appeal denied, 111 
N.E.3d 1121 (N.Y. 2018). 
186 78 N.Y.S.3d 408 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2018), leave to appeal denied, 111 N.E.3d 1121 
(N.Y. 2018). 
187 Id. at 410. 
188 Brief for the Respondent at 1, People v. Pino, 78 N.Y.S.3d 408 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2018) 
(No. 2017-01048.) 2017 WL 10716689, at 1. 
189 Pino, 78 N.Y.S.3d at 411 (quoting People v. Cabrera, 887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008)) 
(citations omitted). 
190 People v. Derival, 181 A.D.3d 918 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020). 
191 Id. 
192 181 A.D.3d 918 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020). 
193 “In cases concerning charges of criminally negligent homicide arising out of automobile 
accidents involving excess rates of speed, ‘it takes some additional affirmative act by the 
defendant to transform speeding into dangerous speeding.’”  Id. (quoting People v. Cabrera, 
887 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y. 2008)) (citations omitted). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 See Olsen, 1 N.Y.S.3d 555 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015). 
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2. Second-Degree Manslaughter 
A person is guilty of second-degree manslaughter when “[h]e 
recklessly causes the death of another person.”197  First, second-degree 
manslaughter requires causation.198  The accused’s criminal 
negligence must cause the victim’s death.  Second, the accused must 
perceive the risk and consciously disregard it.199  Therefore, in second-
degree manslaughter, knowledge of the risk is critical.200 
In People v. Taylor,201 the accused failed to stop at a flashing 
red traffic signal.  The accused struck a vehicle, and as a result of the 
accident, the driver of the other vehicle died.202  The People presented 
evidence that the accused drank several beers that night.203  
Furthermore, at trial, a witness testified that he told the accused “that 
if he did not slow down, he would kill somebody.”204  However, on 
appeal, the Third Department found too much time elapsed between 
the statements about the accused’s driving and the accident.205  
Therefore, even when considering the totality of the accused’s 
conduct—drinking, speeding, running traffic lights, and ignoring 
comments to slow down—it did not rise to the level of criminal 
negligence.206 
 
197 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1) (McKinney 2019). 
198 See People v. Raymond, 867 N.Y.S.2d 643 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2008). 
199 “The crime of manslaughter in the second degree requires the People to establish that 
defendant recklessly caused the death of another by creating and consciously disregarding a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.”  People v. Hart, 698 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (App. Div. 
3d Dep’t 1999). 
200 People v. Kern, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4, 18 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1989), aff'd, 554 N.E.2d 1235 
(N.Y. 1990): 
[I]f the defendant is aware of the risk of death and consciously disregards 
it and the risk is of such a nature that disregard thereof is a gross deviation 
of the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would have observed 
under those circumstances, he is guilty of reckless manslaughter in the 
second degree if death results. 
Id. 
201 297 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1969). 
202 Id. at 193. 
203 Id. at 193-94. 
204 Id. at 194. 
205 The witness told the accused that his driving would “kill someone” three hours before the 
accident.  Id. 
206 “To convict of manslaughter, second degree, under the circumstances, it would be 
necessary to hold that the act of passing a red blinking traffic light without stopping was a 
conscious disregard of a risk.”  Id. 
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However, general familiarity with an area may lead to the 
inference that a person consciously disregarded a known risk.207  In 
People v. Heinsohn,208 the accused operated an unregistered vehicle at 
a high rate of speed on a busy city road.  To get around heavy traffic, 
the accused allegedly maneuvered his vehicle into the median so that 
he could overtake a work truck.209  The maneuver caused the accused 
to strike two people on a pedestrian refuge island.210  
At trial, the accused took the stand.211  During cross-
examination, the accused testified that he had a general familiarity with 
the area.212  The court held that “[t]he jury was properly permitted to 
conclude that when the defendant, knowing that there was a safety 
island ahead, pulled out from behind the van, leaving the traffic lanes 
and crossing the dividing line, he consciously disregarded the 
substantial risk that pedestrians would be standing on the island.”213  
Therefore, a jury can make the inference that the accused had criminal 
negligence because he had a general familiarity with the area and 
drove at an excessive speed in an unregistered vehicle.214 
Generally, second-degree manslaughter can survive the “rule 
of two” because, unlike criminally negligent homicide, the driver has 
an awareness of the risk.  In People v. Asaro,215 the accused drove 
double the posted speed limit on a windy country road.216  At one point, 
the accused stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road to “rev its 
engine.”217  Right after stopping, the accused rapidly accelerated and 
crossed a double yellow line, which caused the accused to crash head-
on into another vehicle.218  The impact of the crash caused the death of 
 
207 See People v. Heinsohn, 459 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1983), aff'd, 462 N.E.2d 
145 (N.Y. 1984); see also People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y. 1990) (an intervening cause 
does not necessarily negate the accused’s criminally negligent conduct.). 
208 459 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1983). 
209 Id. 
210 Id.; A pedestrian refugee island is an elevated surface on a roadway.  The refuge island 
gives pedestrians a place to wait as they cross a wide road.  Refuge islands are often found on 
large roadways where a pedestrian cannot cross the road in one traffic light interval.  See 
Pedestrian Refuge, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION (June 2018), 
https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/ped_bike/step/docs/techSheet_PedRefugeIsland2018.pdf.  
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 330. 
213 Id. at 331. 
214People v. Heinsohn, 462 N.E.2d 145-46 (N.Y. 1984). 
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the other driver.219  At the trial, a witness testified that the accused had 
an awareness of the dangerous curve on the road because the witness 
warned him.220  Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the accused 
“consciously disregard[ed] the risk he created” when he “used a public 
road as his personal drag strip to showcase the capabilities of his 
modified sports car.”221 
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
As mentioned above, other jurisdictions have tailored their 
statutes to quantify specific types of negligent conduct as vehicular 
manslaughter.  Georgia casts a wide net; nearly any traffic infraction 
can lead to a conviction of homicide by vehicle.222  In contrast, New 
Jersey periodically updates its vehicular homicide statute to include 
new problematic conduct.223   
1. Georgia’s Catch-All Model  
Homicide by vehicle, in Georgia, is when a person violates the 
Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law, and that violation causes the death of 
another.224  Homicide by vehicle in the first degree is when the accused 
allegedly causes the death of another while fleeing from the police,225 
passing a stopped school bus,226 recklessly driving,227 driving under 
the influence,228 or leaves the scene of an accident.229  First-degree 
homicide by vehicle is a felony that can result in a sentence of three-
 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 814 (quoting People v. Heinsohn, 462 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1984):  
“Later, just before the collision, Ligenzowski pleaded with defendant to 
slow down because they were ‘about to make the turn.’  Taken together, 
‘there was sufficient proof for the jury to find that defendant was aware of 
and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his 
actions would cause the death of another.’” (citations omitted). 
Id. 
221 Id.  
222 See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (2020). 
223 Cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020), with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-5 (West 2012), 
and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-5 (West 2003). 
224 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2020). 
225 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-395 (2020). 
226 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-163 (2020). 
227 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-390 (2020). 
228 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391 (2020). 
229 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2020). 
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to-fifteen years.230  Any other offense of the Vehicle and Traffic code 
that causes the death of another person is second-degree homicide by 
vehicle.231  Second-degree homicide by vehicle is a misdemeanor that 
carries a one-year maximum sentence.232   
Homicide by vehicle is a strict liability offense.233  
Furthermore, the State does not need to prove specific intent to commit 
the underlining Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law infraction.234  
However, the State must prove that the accused’s conduct is the “legal 
and proximate” cause of the victim’s death.235  Therefore, if the 
accused broke a traffic law and was the proximate cause of the victim’s 
death, then she is guilty of homicide by vehicle. 
  2. New Jersey’s Selective Approach 
New Jersey’s reckless vehicular homicide statute is similar to 
Sections 125.12, 125.13, and 125.14 of New York’s Penal Law.  
However, in New York, the Legislature limited its vehicular homicide 
statutes to accidents that concern alcohol consumption or the 
transportation of hazardous materials.236  By contrast, New Jersey did 
not limit its reckless vehicular homicide statute to driving under the 
influence.237  Nonetheless, in New Jersey, some statutes address 
homicide caused by driving a vehicle while intoxicated as a strict 
liability offense.238   
Unlike New York’s statutes, New Jersey’s vehicular homicide 
statute allow a jury to draw inferences about the accused’s conduct.  In 
New Jersey, proof that the accused did any of the proscribed types of 
 
230 Id. 
231 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (c) (2020). 
232 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3 (2020). 
233 State v. Ogilvie, 734 S.E.2d 50, 53 (Ga. 2012) 
234 Ogilvie, 734 S.E.2d at 53: 
“A charge on accident is appropriate for this crime only when there is 
evidence that the defendant did not voluntarily drive into the crosswalk 
instead of stopping for a pedestrian who was located in the statutorily 
protected area.  At trial, Ogilvie did not dispute that she voluntarily drove 
into the crosswalk and struck the child there. . . .” 
Id. 
235 McGrath v. State, 627 S.E.2d 866, 869 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
236 Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020), with N.Y. Penal Law § 125.12 - 125.14 
(McKinney 2019). 
237 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020). 
238 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5.3 (West 2020) (However, that statute is outside the purposes 
of this note as this note concerns careless driving other than driving while intoxicated.). 
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conduct “may give rise to an inference that the [the accused] was 
driving recklessly.”239  New Jersey made law lists such conduct as 
using a cell phone, falling asleep while driving, driving without proper 
sleep, or failure to maintain a lane a second-degree crime when such 
conduct causes the death of another person.240  A person found guilty 
of second-degree reckless vehicular homicide can face a five-to-ten 
year sentence.241 
However, if a person causes the death of another while driving 
on school grounds, illegally driving through a school crossing, or 
driving through an undesignated school crossing with the knowledge 
that juveniles are present, that is a first-degree crime under the New 
Jersey’s reckless vehicular homicide statute.242  A person found guilty 
of first-degree vehicular homicide can face a ten-to-twenty year 
sentence.243 
V.  ANALYSIS  
Stakeholders need to take action to correct dangerous road 
conditions.  It is crucial now because higher density development is 
supposed to encourage people to walk to nearby businesses and 
transportation stops.244  However, at the same time—as evident by the 
need for parking—higher density development does not necessarily 
reduce car dependency.245  Therefore, people who walk must still 
contend with dangerous road conditional caused by careless drivers.  
Moreover, the current methodology which focusses on educating 
drivers and pedestrians about road safety is not enough.246   
A. Regression 
In the early twentieth century, a felony conviction carried 
severe consequences; accordingly, judges were hesitant “to attach the 
grave consequences of a felony conviction to results by mere 
inadvertence or carelessness.”247  Prior to the revised Penal Law, New 
 
239 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020). 
240 Id. 
241 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6 (West 2020). 
242  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020). 
243 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6 (West 2020). 
244 Sullivan, supra note 2. 
245 LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL supra note 7. 
246 Retting, supra note 23 
247 CLACK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 10.13 (7th ed. 1967). 
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York Courts defined criminal negligence as “a disregard of the 
consequences which may ensue from the act, and indifference to the 
rights of others.”248  Therefore, to combat death caused by careless 
conduct, legislatures enacted lesser statutes.249   
In New York, under the old Penal Law, the Legislature created 
a vehicular homicide statute that criminalized reckless or negligent 
conduct while operating a vehicle that resulted in another person’s 
death.250  However, the vehicular homicide statute did not include the 
“failure to perceive” a risk associated with careless conduct.251  
Therefore, New York’s early vehicular homicide statute did not have 
teeth because it still required that the accused consciously participate 
in careless conduct, which resulted in death.252 
In the 1960s,253 New York revised its Penal Code—it 
eliminated vehicular homicide—and enacted statutes that comprised 
reckless driving, reckless endangerment, vehicular manslaughter, 
criminally negligent homicide, and second-degree manslaughter,254 
because of the courts’ reluctance to convict an accused of involuntary 
manslaughter for causing death through careless driving.255  Under the 
revised Penal Law, the Legislature enacted criminally negligent 
homicide to address “a wide spectrum of fatal conduct of both 
omission and commission.”256  Therefore, criminally negligent 
homicide replaced New York’s old vehicular homicide statute and 
carried a lesser burden of proof.257 
However, since the enactment of New York’s revised Penal 
Law, the courts have chipped away at the effectiveness of using 
 
248 See People v. Angelo, 159 N.E. 394, 396 (N.Y. 1927); see also Robert P. Fine & Gary M. 
Cohen, Is Criminal Negligence a Defensible Basis for Penal Liability?, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 
753 (1967). 
249 See CLARK, supra note 247. 
250 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1053-a (repealed 1967) (“A person who operates or drives any 
vehicle of any kind in a reckless or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is 
killed, is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle resulting in death.”).  
251 See Fine, supra note 248. 
252 See CLARK, supra note 247. 
253 The New York State Legislature ratified the Penal Law in 1965.  The Penal Law came into 
effect on September 1, 1967.  See SIXTH INTERN REPORT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 
TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE (February 1, 
1967) archived at  
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d7df/7812c0b0cc91fe85ff84d7042b1efa1e64b8.pdf. 
254 CLARK, supra note 247. 
255 Id. 
256 Hechtman, Practice Commentary, MCKINNEY’S CONS LAWS OF NY, Book 39, Penal Law 
§ 125.10 (1975). 
257 Id. 
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criminal statutes to penalize careless drivers.  The decision in Cabrera 
reflects as much, and the Cabrera decision may be what caused the so-
called “rule of two.”  Trial courts are using Cabrera as a means to 
dismiss homicide charges against careless drivers.258  Cabrera had an 
immediate chilling effect on using the criminally negligent homicide 
statute to deter careless driving.   
On September 5, 2008, three months after Cabrera, a Suffolk 
County judge, dismissed charges of criminally negligent homicide 
against a driver who caused the death of three people as a result of 
speeding.259  The accused was driving over eighty-seven miles-per-
hour in a fifty-five miles-per-hour zone.260  The driver “dramatically” 
pressed the brakes, which caused the vehicle to spin into oncoming 
traffic.261  A minivan traveling in the opposite direction—under the 
posted speed limit—broadsided the accused’s vehicle.262  The force of 
the accident caused the death of two teenagers in the accused’s vehicle 
and the death of the minivan driver’s son.263 
The county court judge held that while teenage death caused by 
inexperience driving is tragic, it did not rise to the level of criminal 
negligence.264  Citing Cabrera, which the county court judge noted, 
the facts were eerily similar.265  The judge held that criminal 
negligence required risk creation.266  The judge reasoned that merely 
speeding, even excess of thirty miles per hour, on a busy suburban 
road, during rush hour, is not “blameworthy conduct,” which rises to 
the level of risk creation that the Court of Appeals set in Cabrera. 267  
Thus, the court acknowledged the “rule of two,” without explicitly 
mentioning it.   
Nevertheless, the accused “allegedly drove ‘in a manner which 
unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of the public 
highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway,’” 
therefore, the county court judge did not dismiss the reckless driving 
charge.268  Consequently, for causing the death of three people, the 
 
258 See People v. Badke, 865 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 2008). 
259 People v. Badke, 865 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 2008). 
260 Id. at 490-91. 
261 Id. at 494. 
262 Id. at 490-91. 
263 Id. at 490. 
264 Id. at 494. 
265 Id. at 492 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 494. 
268 Id. 
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driver pled guilty and received a thirty-day sentence and a revoked 
driver’s license.269  
As noted above, despite transit-oriented development and 
programs to improve road safety—pedestrian deaths are on the rise.  
When the Court of Appeals decided Cabrera, it set the standards back 
eighty years to a time where the courts did not want to find a careless 
driver guilty of a felony.270  For example, in the 1934 case of People 
v. Grieco,271 the Court of Appeals did not want to convict a driver who 
caused the death of a person by driving intoxicated, of first-degree 
manslaughter, which was a felony.  The court wrote that “[t]he degree 
of the crime cannot be fixed ‘by analyzing the constituent acts which, 
in combination, make up the transaction, and viewing them 
distributively.  It is determined by the quality and purpose of the 
transaction as a whole.”272  Furthermore, the court held that it is 
improper to take a misdemeanor Vehicle and Traffic Law violation that 
is a crime against society and use it to prove a crime against a 
person.273  However, today prosecutor in Grieco could have used New 
York’s alcohol-related vehicular homicide statutes. 
 
269 Smithtown Teen Gets 30 Days for Crash That Killed 3, NEWS12 LONG ISLAND (Dec. 04, 
2008 12:37 PM), http://longisland.news12.com/story/34765843/smithtown-teen-gets-30-
days-for-crash-that-killed-3. 
270 See generally People v. Grieco, 193 N.E. 634, 635 (N.Y. 1934): 
“The Vehicle and Traffic Law makes many offenses misdemeanors.  If this 
conviction should be sustained, every driver of an automobile, who, while 
committing one of the offenses defined as a misdemeanor in that act, 
accidentally causes the death of a person, will be guilty of the crime of 
manslaughter in the first degree no matter how thoughtless or unintentional 
the act.” 
Id. 
271 193 N.E. 634, 635 (N.Y. 1934). 
272 Id. at 635. 
273 Id.: 
“A moment before the collision the defendant's conduct constituted a 
crime, a misdemeanor against society, against law and order, and against 
the people of the state.  The commission of the misdemeanor in which he 
was engaged was not one affecting the person or property of deceased or 
of another.  He had not seen the deceased and did not know that she was 
present.  The fact that his automobile struck her could not instantly change 
his conduct so as to make it an act affecting the person of the deceased and 
thereby make him liable for the crime of manslaughter in the first degree.”  
Id.  
28
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B. Public Perception 
It is also important to note that in 2009 when the court decided 
Cabrera, accident fatalities, more specifically pedestrian fatalities, 
were the lowest ever recorded in the nation’s history.274  Ten years 
since Cabrera, pedestrian deaths are as high as they were in the 
1970s.275  To that end, the public perception of pedestrian-involved 
vehicle accidents can use an attitude check.  Public perception is 
important because, under a theory of general deterrence, the public 
must take note of the unlawful conduct, and the punishment must 
shock the public into avoiding similar conduct.276   
Generally, commentators on social media and news websites 
voice anger and frustration towards dead pedestrians and get annoyed 
that a driver’s day may get delayed.277  Some posters question why 
pedestrians use roads, “[t]his is sad.  B[ut] why walk at night in [the] 
rain. . . .”278  Blaming walkers even extends to parking lots—where 
one-out-of-four pedestrian deaths occur.279  In a post about a pedestrian 
who got struck and killed in a parking lot, one commenter wrote, “[s]o 
sad but people fail to pay attention to cars in parking lots all the [] 
time!”280 
 
274 Retting, supra note 23, at 12. 
275 Id. 
276 Basham, supra note 48. 
277 See “There is something wrong with these people.  Nobody ever taught them how to walk 
on the street?”  Donald Grasso, Stringer News, FACEBOOK (Mar. 17, 2020, 7:38 PM) 
(commenting on a post about a pedestrian struck by a vehicle); see also “I don’t know if it [is] 
ignorance, []arrogance, []or just plain stupidity.  []They walk and ride bicycles straight into 
the path of a vehicle and expect them to stop on a dime.  []And they’re usually all but invisible 
because they wear dark colors.  []Meanwhile the driver not only has their vehicle damaged 
and their day delayed, []they have to live with the fact they killed someone even if it was 
unintentional.  []The roads are getting worse and worse because people don’t use common 
sense.”  Thomas F. Cullen Jr., Stringer News, FACEBOOK (Mar. 17, 2020, 8:36 PM) 
(responding to Donald Grasso); see also “A law should be [e]nacted for [people] walking at 
night [t]hat they should carry a flashlight or wear neon gear so that they could be seen easily.  
So many stories I read where [people] are struck and killed walking in the dark.”  Terry Ciulla, 
Patch.com Homeless Man in Wheelchair Fatally Struck by Car: PD, FACEBOOK (Feb. 11, 2020 
7:21 PM) (commenting on the death of 62-year-old man in a wheelchair who was struck by a 
vehicle while crossing a road). 
278 Matthew Savage, Stringer News, FACEBOOK (Dec. 24, 2017 12:07 AM) 
 https://www.facebook.com/pg/StringerNewsService/posts/?ref=page_internal.  
279 Accardo, infra note 284; Chris Giarratana, How Safe Are Pedestrians in Local Parking 
Lots, SAFETY RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 17, 2018),  
https://www.trafficsafetystore.com/blog/tips-for-enhancing-parking-lot-pedestrian-safety. 
280 Anthony Accardo, Stringer News, FACEBOOK (May 21, 2019)  
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Socioeconomic status can create a public perception of the 
victim.281  Socioeconomic status is apparent in enforcement, 
improvements, and prosecution.  Generally, pedestrians are dying at a 
faster rate in more disadvantaged neighborhoods.282  In some 
jurisdictions, accidents that involve a pedestrian fatality are not “even 
judged worth a traffic ticket.”283  Commonly, suburban people view 
commuting through the use of walking and mass transportation as tools 
for the poor.284  Therefore, prosecutors treat accidents that result in the 
death of a pedestrian differently.   
C. General Deterrence and Public Perception 
In some circumstances, prosecutors will bring a case because 
of community pressure.285  Whereas, in other circumstances, similar 
cases might not even get the attention of the press, let alone a 
prosecutor.286  The two examples below, while anecdotal, demonstrate 
the inequalities of prosecution.  The first case concerns a youth from 
an affluent neighborhood who died as a result of car-surfing.287  The 
second case concerns a middle-aged woman who was hit by a vehicle 
and dragged some distance down the road in a lower-middle-income 
 
281 Maciag, infra note 286. 
282 Mike Maciag, Pedestrians Dying at Disproportionate Rates in America's Poorer 
Neighborhoods, GOVERNING (Aug. 2014), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-
safety/gov-pedestrian-deaths-analysis.html: 
“Select areas, typically downtowns and business districts, are often 
targeted for improvements, it’s the less visible lower-income 
neighborhoods where pedestrians are dying at the highest rates.  It’s not 
just an inner-city problem -- at least, not for long.  As more low-income 
residents are priced out of downtowns, and as poverty continues to rise in 
less pedestrian-friendly suburban communities, higher pedestrian death 
tolls could follow.”   
Id. 
283 Eric Roper, In Crashes That Kill Pedestrians, The Majority of Drivers Don't Face Charges, 
STAR TRIBUNE (May 22, 2016 10:41 AM), https://www.startribune.com/in-crashes-that-kill-
pedestrians-the-majority-of-drivers-don-t-face-charges/380345481/?refresh=true.  
284 “Nowadays, many local politicians don't see transit as a vital transportation function — 
instead, they think of it as a government aid program to help poor people who lack cars.”  
Joseph Stromberg, The Real Reason American Public Transportation Is Such A Disaster, VOX 
(Aug. 10, 2015, 5:49 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/8/10/9118199/public-transportation-
subway-buses.  
285 See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
321 (2002). 
286 See Id. 
287 See QuickFacts Cold Spring Harbor CDP, New York, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU 
(Jul. 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/coldspringharborcdpnewyork. 
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area.288  Both incidents happened in the same jurisdiction within 
months of each other. 
1. Car-surfing Incident 
On September 23, 2018, three youths solicited an Uber driver 
into letting them surf on the roof of the driver’s vehicle.289  That night, 
the youths were using Uber to hop between different parties in Cold 
Spring Harbor, an affluent suburban neighborhood.290  During the last 
trip home, the youths offered the driver $70 to allow them to car-
surf.291  At first, the driver refused, after pressuring the driver, the 
youths persuaded him to let them car-surf in exchange for $40.292   
Two of the youths surfed on the Uber driver’s vehicle, as the 
other youth filmed it to post on social media.293  One youth fell off the 
vehicle and suffered a head injury.294  However, the victim did not seek 
medical treatment and died in his sleep as a result of the head injury.295  
Under a theory of general deterrence, the People prosecuted the Uber 
driver.  According to the District Attorney:  
We have a culture right now where the mindset is, “How 
can we outdo each other?” particularly among young 
people on social media, and we often see the tragic 
consequences of that. . . .  A lot of young people think 
they are invincible, and that’s something we need to 
keep drilling in their heads — that this could happen to 
anyone when you engage in this kind of conduct.296 
Therefore, here, the People sought to deter other youths from car-
surfing, not necessarily dissuade other Uber drivers from allowing 
customers to surf on their vehicles, but to use the publicity from 
prosecuting the Uber driver to discourage car-surfing among youths.  
 
288 QuickFacts Deer Park CDP, New York, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/deerparkcdpnewyork/PST045219. 
289 Robert Brodsky, Parents Forgive Uber Driver Responsible for Son's 'Car Surfing' Death, 
NEWSDAY (Feb. 14, 2020 6:06 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/car-
surfing-uber-driver-sentencing-1.41829885.   
290 Id. 
291 Michael O'Keeffe, Uber Driver Charged with Manslaughter in Death of Car Surfer, Suffolk 
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Ultimately, the Uber driver pled guilty to second-degree manslaughter 
and received a sentence of ten-months’ time-served and five years of 
probation.297  Here, the People had a strong case for second-degree 
manslaughter because the driver initially refused the request.  Refusing 
the request to allow the youths to car-surf could demonstrate a 
conscious awareness of the risk. 
2. Vehicle Dragging Incident 
In contrast, in the same jurisdiction and during the same year, 
prosecutors only charged a delivery driver who hit and dragged a 
pedestrian to her death with leaving the scene of an accident.298  The 
delivery driver was leaving his drop off at an auto parts store when he 
hit two pedestrians.299  The collision knocked the first pedestrian to the 
ground.300  However, the collision caused the delivery truck to suck 
the second pedestrian into the wheel well.301  The delivery driver 
continued on his way, ignoring the screams of the pedestrian and 
bystanders.302  The delivery driver dragged the second pedestrian a 
half-mile down the road “zigzagged and fishtailed” across the road 
“before [the pedestrian’s] body became dislodged. . . .”303   
Witnesses claimed the driver got out of the delivery truck, 
looked at the dead pedestrian, and drove away.304  The police caught 
the delivery driver at his next stop, and he allegedly told detectives that 
he “didn’t think she was alive,” and stated that he “panicked, and 
[needed] to get to [his] next job.”305  Days after the accident, members 
of the community said there were still “reddish-colored skid marks” 
down the road.306   
 
297 Brodsky, supra note 293.   
298 Andrew Smith, Sini: Autozone Delivery Driver May Face Increased Charges in Death of 








305 Id. (quotes are statements made by the District Attorney to the press on the day of the 
arraignment). 
306 Donnell Hicks Indicted for Fatal Hit-And-Run; Funeral Held for East Quogue Woman, 




Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2020], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss2/5
2020 HOW TO DETER PEDESTRIAN DEATHS 467 
The People charged the delivery driver with leaving the scene 
of an accident without reporting when there is an injury.307  The 
delivery driver pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident, and he 
is currently awaiting sentencing.308   
Under current law, in the vehicle dragging incident, 
prosecutors cannot sustain a conviction that requires either criminal 
negligence or recklessness.  First, criminal negligence does not apply 
because the driver’s blameworthy conduct is the failure to see the 
pedestrians.  As stated in Pino and Deriva, miscalculation when 
driving is not morally blameworthy conduct. 
D. Time to get rid of the “Rule of Two” 
In Cabrera, the Court of Appeals gutted any severe 
consequences of careless driving that causes death or severe harm.  
Under current law, a prosecutor cannot convict a careless driver, let 
alone a driver who causes death to others by excessively speeding.  
Currently, the driver needs to commit an overt act beyond a minor 
traffic offense, which then turns the driver’s negligent conduct into 
something more significant than a mere traffic infraction.  
Nevertheless, New York has a few possibilities to make the 
consequences of killing a pedestrian severe.   
First, New York can enact a catch-all statute like Georgia’s 
homicide by vehicle statute.  Under Georgia’s statute, anyone who 
causes the death of a person as a result of breaking a traffic law can 
face a homicide conviction.309  However, there are downsides to 
 
307 Complaint, People v. Hicks, 01296-2019 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 2019); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW 
§ 600 (McKinney 2019):  
“Any person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing or having cause to 
know that personal injury has been caused to another person, due to an 
incident involving the motor vehicle operated by such person shall, before 
leaving the place where the said personal injury occurred, stop, exhibit his 
or her license and insurance identification card for such vehicle, when such 
card is required pursuant to articles six and eight of this chapter, and give 
his or her name, residence, including street and street number, insurance 
carrier and insurance identification information including but not limited 
to the number and effective dates of said individual's insurance policy and 
license number, to the injured party, if practical, and also to a police 
officer, or in the event that no police officer is in the vicinity of the place 
of said injury, then, he or she shall report said incident as soon as 
physically able to the nearest police station or judicial officer.” 
Id. 
308 Appearances, People v. Hicks, 01296-2019 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 2019). 
309 See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2020). 
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Georgia’s statute.  First, some people in Georgia find the State’s catch-
all statute too lenient.310  Without aggravating factors, most deaths 
caused by a driver’s traffic infractions fall under second-degree 
homicide by vehicle.311  The maximum penalty under second-degree 
homicide by vehicle is one year.312 
Georgia’s first-degree homicide by vehicle statute does carry a 
fifteen-year maximum sentence.313  However, the driver must violate 
specific sections of Georgia’s Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law.314  For 
instance, if a driver leaves the scene of a fatal accident, the State can 
charge her with first-degree homicide by vehicle.315  Therefore, if New 
York had a statute similar to Georgia’s homicide by vehicle statute, the 
driver in the vehicle dragging incident could have faced a three-to-
fifteen-year sentence.   
People who advocate for reforming the Georgia statute would 
like to see the list of proscribed conduct under first-degree homicide 
by vehicle expanded.316  Their argument may have merit; however, the 
Georgia statute is a good one because it recognizes that a person who 
causes the death of another—with a vehicle—caused a homicide.  The 
same cannot be said in New York, where the courts think the death of 
a person caused by a driver is a tragedy—not culpable criminal 
conduct.317  However, in Georgia, if a driver sets off a chain of events 
that causes a “tragedy,” the driver is branded as someone who 
committed a homicide.  That could have a general deterrence effect on 
future careless drivers.  
Second, New York can amend its vehicular homicide statutes 
to include more conduct.  Currently, New York limits charges of 
vehicular homicide to accidents that involve intoxication or hazardous 
materials.318  However, states like New Jersey regularly update its 
vehicular homicide statutes to include new problematic conduct that 
 
310 See Tim Chitwood, How Can Homicide By Vehicle Be A Misdemeanor?, LEDGER-
ENQUIRER (Mar. 2, 2017 6:15 PM), ledger-enquirer.com/news/local/article136029928.html.   
311 See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2020). 
312 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3 (2020). 
313 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (a), (b), (d) (2020). 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 Chitwood, supra note 314. 
317 “[T]he Court must look to the conduct of the defendant which caused the accident in 
determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence as to criminal negligence, not the results, no 
matter how tragic those results.”  Badke, 865 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95. 
318 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 - 125.14 (McKinney 2019). 
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includes drowsy driving, falling asleep, using a handled device, failure 
to maintain a lane while driving.319   
The limitations of the New Jersey Statute is that it enumerates 
specific conduct.320  However, the value in the New Jersey statute is 
that it allows a jury to draw an inference that the accused acted with 
criminal negligence if she committed any of the enumerated 
conduct.321  Another downside to the New Jersey statute is that it limits 
conduct where the jury can draw an automatic inference.  However, 
the enumerated conduct does not foreclose a vehicular homicide 
conviction.  If the accused’s actions fall outside of the conduct that the 
Legislature proscribes, a prosecutor can still secure a vehicular 
homicide conviction if she can prove that operator drove recklessly.322   
VI. CONCLUSION 
If the Legislature is serious about transit-oriented development 
and curtailing car dependency, it must enact new statutes that 
recognize the seriousness of careless driving.  Currently, in the United 
States, New York ranks at the top of people who walk and use public 
transportation to commute to work.323  Therefore, it is shocking that 
New York lacks hard consequences for negligent conduct that results 
in the death of a pedestrian.   
Therefore, to deter future careless driving, the Legislature 
should make the consequences for the negligent death of a pedestrian 
more severe.  Encouraging high-density development that attracts 
people to walk without having severe consequences for negligent 
conduct that causes the death of a pedestrian is unconscionable.     
 
 
319 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 2020). 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
322 “A driver need not be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs to drive recklessly; a 
finding of recklessness can be premised upon excessive speed, among other factors.”  State v. 
Buckley, 78 A.3d 958, 966 (N.J. 2013). 
323 “Less than 3 percent (2.7 percent) of Americans walk to work.  But more than 5 percent of 
workers do in New York City (5.9 percent).”  “Five percent of U.S. commuters use transit to 
get to work.  New York City, with its extensive subway and rail system, is the big outlier 
here—more than 30 percent of workers get to their jobs by transit in greater New York City.”  
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